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25 August 2025

The biggest blockages to successful governance of advanced AI

“Humanity has never faced a greater problem than itself.”

That phrase was what my brain hallucinated, while I was browsing the opening section of the Introduction of the groundbreaking new book Global Governance of the Transition to Artificial General Intelligence written by my friend and colleague Jerome C. Glenn, Executive Director of The Millennium Project.

I thought to myself: That’s a bold but accurate way of summing up the enormous challenge faced by humanity over the next few years.

In previous centuries, our biggest problems have often come from the environment around us: deadly pathogens, devastating earthquakes, torrential storms, plagues of locusts – as well as marauding hordes of invaders from outside our local neighbourhood.

But in the second half of the 2020s, our problems are being compounded as never before by our own human inadequacies:

  • We’re too quick to rush to judgement, seeing only parts of the bigger picture
  • We’re too loyal to the tribes to which we perceive ourselves as belonging
  • We’re overconfident in our ability to know what’s happening
  • We’re too comfortable with manufacturing and spreading untruths and distortions
  • We’re too bound into incentive systems that prioritise short-term rewards
  • We’re too fatalistic, as regards the possible scenarios ahead.

You may ask, What’s new?

What’s new is the combination of these deep flaws in human nature with technology that is remarkably powerful yet opaque and intractable. AI that is increasingly beyond our understanding and beyond our control is being coupled in potentially devastating ways with our over-hasty, over-tribal, over-confident thoughts and actions. New AI systems are being rushed into deployment and used in attempts:

  • To manufacture and spread truly insidious narratives
  • To incentivize people around the world to act against their own best interests, and
  • To resign people to inaction when in fact it is still within their power to alter and uplift the trajectory of human destiny.

In case this sounds like a counsel of despair, I should clarify at once my appreciation of aspects of human nature that are truly wonderful, as counters to the negative characteristics that I have already mentioned:

  • Our thoughtfulness, that can counter rushes to judgement
  • Our collaborative spirit, that can transcend partisanship
  • Our wisdom, that can recognise our areas of lack of knowledge or lack of certainty
  • Our admiration for truth, integrity, and accountability, that can counter ends-justify-the-means expediency
  • Our foresight, that can counter short-termism and free us from locked-in inertia
  • Our creativity, to imagine and then create better futures.

Just as AI can magnify the regrettable aspects of human nature, so also it can, if used well, magnify those commendable aspects.

So, which is it to be?

The fundamental importance of governance

The question I’ve just asked isn’t a question that can be answered by individuals alone. Any one group – whether an organisation, a corporation, or a decentralised partnership – can have its own beneficial actions overtaken and capsized by catastrophic outcomes of groups that failed to heed the better angels of their nature, and which, instead, allowed themselves to be governed by wishful naivety, careless bravado, pangs of jealousy, hostile alienation, assertive egotism, or the madness of the crowd.

That’s why the message of this new book by Jerome Glenn is so timely: the processes of developing and deploying increasingly capable AIs are something that needs to be:

  • Governed, rather than happening chaotically
  • Globally coordinated, rather than there being no cohesion between the different governance processes applicable in different localities
  • Progressed urgently, without being shut out of mind by all the shorter-term issues that, understandably, also demand governance attention.

Before giving more of my own thoughts about this book, let me share some of the commendations it has received:

  • “This book is an eye-opening study of the transition to a completely new chapter of history.” – Csaba Korösi, 77th President of the UN General Assembly
  • “A comprehensive overview, drawing both on leading academic and industry thinkers worldwide, and valuable perspectives from within the OECD, United Nations.” – Jaan Tallinn, founding engineer, Skype and Kazaa; co-founder, Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and the Future of Life Institute
  • “Written in lucid and accessible language, this book is a must read for people who care about the governance and policy of AGI.” – Lan Xue, Chair of the Chinese National Expert Committee on AI Governance.

The book also carries an absorbing foreword by Ben Goertzel. In this foreword, Ben introduces himself as follows:

Since the 1980s, I have been immersed in the field of AI, working to unravel the complexities of intelligence and to build systems capable of emulating it. My journey has included introducing and popularizing the concept of AGI, developing innovative AGI software frameworks such as OpenCog, and leading efforts to decentralize AI development through initiatives like SingularityNET and the ASI Alliance. This work has been driven by an understanding that AGI is not just an engineering challenge but a profound societal pivot point – a moment requiring foresight, ethical grounding, and global collaboration.

He clarifies why the subject of the book is so important:

The potential benefits of AGI are vast: solutions to climate change, the eradication of diseases, the enrichment of human creativity, and the possibility of postscarcity economies. However, the risks are equally significant. AGI, wielded irresponsibly or emerging in a poorly aligned manner, could exacerbate inequalities, entrench authoritarianism, or unleash existential dangers. At this critical juncture, the questions of how AGI will be developed, governed, and integrated into society must be addressed with both urgency and care.

The need for a globally participatory approach to AGI governance cannot be overstated. AGI, by its nature, will be a force that transcends national borders, cultural paradigms, and economic systems. To ensure its benefits are distributed equitably and its risks mitigated effectively, the voices of diverse communities and stakeholders must be included in shaping its development. This is not merely a matter of fairness but a pragmatic necessity. A multiplicity of perspectives enriches our understanding of AGI’s implications and fosters the global trust needed to govern it responsibly.

He then offers wide praise for the contents of the book:

This is where the work of Jerome Glenn and The Millennium Project may well prove invaluable. For decades, The Millennium Project has been at the forefront of fostering participatory futures thinking, weaving together insights from experts across disciplines and geographies to address humanity’s most pressing challenges. In Governing the Transition to Artificial General Intelligence, this expertise is applied to one of the most consequential questions of our time. Through rigorous analysis, thoughtful exploration of governance models, and a commitment to inclusivity, this book provides a roadmap for navigating the complexities of AGI’s emergence.

What makes this work particularly compelling is its grounding in both pragmatism and idealism. It does not shy away from the technical and geopolitical hurdles of AGI governance, nor does it ignore the ethical imperatives of ensuring AGI serves the collective good. It recognizes that governing AGI is not a task for any single entity but a shared responsibility requiring cooperation among nations, corporations, civil society, and, indeed, future AGI systems themselves.

As we venture into this new era, this book reminds us that the transition to AGI is not solely about technology; it is about humanity, and about life, mind, and complexity in general. It is about how we choose to define intelligence, collaboration, and progress. It is about the frameworks we build now to ensure that the tools we create amplify the best of what it means to be human, and what it means to both retain and grow beyond what we are.

My own involvement

To fill in some background detail: I was pleased to be part of the team that developed the set of 22 critical questions which sat at the heart of the interviews and research which are summarised in Part I of the book – and I conducted a number of the resulting interviews. In parallel, I explored related ideas via two different online Transpolitica surveys:

And I’ve been writing roughly one major article (or giving a public presentation) on similar topics every month since then. Recent examples include:

Over this time period, my views have evolved. I see the biggest priority, nowadays, not as figuring out how to govern AGI as it comes into existence, but rather, how to pause the development and deployment of any new types of AI that could spark the existence of self-improving AGI.

That global pause needs to last long enough that the global community can justifiably be highly confident that any AGI that will subsequently be built will be what I have called a BGI (a Beneficial General Intelligence) rather than a CGI (a Catastrophic General Intelligence).

Govern AGI and/or Pause the development of AGI?

I recently posted a diagram on various social media platforms to illustrate some of the thinking behind that stance of mine:

Alongside that diagram, I offered the following commentary:

The next time someone asks me what’s my p(Doom), compared with my p(SSfA) (the probability of Sustainable Superabundance for all), I may try to talk them through a diagram like this one. In particular, we need to break down the analysis into two cases – will the world keep rushing to build AGI, or will it pause from that rush.

To explain some points from the diagram:

We can reach the very desirable future of SSfA by making wise use of AI only modestly more capable than what we have today;
We might also get there as a side-effect of building AGI, but that’s very risky.

None of the probabilities are meant to be considered precise. They’re just ballpark estimates.

I estimate around 2/3 chance that the world will come to its senses and pause its current headlong rush toward building AGI.

But even in that case, risks of global catastrophe remain.

The date 2045 is also just a ballpark choice. Either of the “singularity” outcomes (wonderful or dreadful) could arrive a lot sooner than that.

The 1/12 probability I’ve calculated for “stat” (I use “stat” here as shorthand for a relatively unchanged status quo) by 2045 reflects my expectation of huge disruptions ahead, one sort or another.

The overall conclusion: if we want SSfA, we’re much more likely to get it via the “pause AGI” branch than via the “headlong rush to AGI” branch.

And whilst doom is possible in either branch, it’s much more likely in the headlong rush branch.

For more discussion of how to get the best out of AI and other cataclysmically disruptive technologies, see my book The Singularity Principles (the entire contents are freely available online).

Feel free to post your own version of this diagram, with your own estimates of the various conditional probabilities.

As indicated, I was hoping for feedback, and I was pleased to see a number of comments and questions in response.

One excellent question was this, by Bill Trowbridge:

What’s the difference between:
(a) better AI, and
(b) AGI

The line is hard to draw. So, we’ll likely just keep making better AI until it becomes AGI.

I offered this answer:

On first thought, it may seem hard to identify that distinction. But thankfully, we humans don’t just throw up our hands in resignation every time we encounter a hard problem.

For a good starting point on making the distinction, see the ideas in “A Narrow Path” by Control AI.

But what surprised me the most was the confidence expressed by various online commenters that:

  • “A pause however desirable is unlikely: p(pause) = 0.01”
  • “I am confident in saying this – pause is not an option. It is actually impossible.”
  • “There are several organisations working on AI development and at least some of them are ungovernable [hence a pause can never be global]”.

There’s evidently a large gulf behind the figure of 2/3 that I suggested for P(pause), and the views of these clearly intelligent respondents.

Why a pause isn’t that inconceivable

I’ll start my argument on this topic by confirming that I see this discussion as deeply important. Different viewpoints are welcome, provided they are held thoughtfully and offered honestly.

Next, although it’s true that some organisations may appear to be ungovernable, I don’t see any fundamental issue here. As I said online,

“Given sufficient public will and/or political will, no organisation is ungovernable.”

Witness the compliance by a number of powerful corporations in both China and the US to control measures declared by national governments.

Of course, smaller actors and decentralized labs pose enforcement challenges, but these labs are less likely to be able to marshal sufficient computing capabilities to be the first to reach breakthrough new levels of capability, especially if decentralised monitoring of dangerous attributes is established.

I’ve drawn attention on previous occasions to the parallel with the apparent headlong rush in the 1980s toward nuclear weapons systems that were ever more powerful and ever more dangerous. As I explained at some length in the “Geopolitics” chapter of my 2021 book Vital Foresight, it was an appreciation of the horrific risks of nuclear winter (first articulated in the 1980s) that helped to catalyse a profound change in attitude amongst the leadership camps in both the US and the USSR.

It’s the wide recognition of risk that can provide the opportunity for governments around the world to impose an effective pause in the headlong rush toward AGI. But that’s only one of five steps that I believe are needed:

  1. Awareness of catastrophic risks
  2. Awareness of bottlenecks
  3. Awareness of mechanisms for verification and control
  4. Awareness of profound benefits ahead
  5. Awareness of the utility of incremental progress

Here are more details about these five steps I envision:

  1. Clarify in an undeniable way how superintelligent AIs could pose catastrophic risks of human disaster within just a few decades or even within years – so that this topic receives urgent high-priority public attention
  2. Highlight bottlenecks and other locations within the AI production pipeline where constraints can more easily be applied (for example, distribution of large GPU chip clusters, and the few companies that are providing unique services in the creation of cutting-edge chips)
  3. Establish mechanisms that go beyond “trust” to “trust and verify”, including robust independent monitors and auditors, as well as tamperproof remote shut-down capabilities
  4. Indicate how the remarkable benefits anticipated for humanity from aspects of superintelligence can be secured, more safely and more reliably, by applying the governance mechanisms of points 2 and 3 above, rather than just blindly trusting in a no-holds-barred race to be the first to create superintelligence
  5. Be prepared to start with simpler agreements, involving fewer signatories and fewer control points, and be ready to build up stronger governance processes and culture as public consensus and understanding moves forward.

Critics can assert that each of these five steps is implausible. In each case, there are some crunchy discussions to be had. What I find dangerous, however, isn’t when people disagree with my assessments on plausibility. It’s when they approach the questions with what seems to be

  • A closed mind
  • A tribal loyalty to their perceived online buddies
  • Overconfidence that they already know all relevant examples and facts in this space
  • A willingness to distract or troll, or to offer arguments not in good faith
  • A desire to protect their flow of income, rather than honestly review new ideas
  • A resignation to the conclusion that humanity is impotent.

(For analysis of a writer who displays several of these tendencies, see my recent blogpost on the book More Everything Forever by Adam Beck.)

I’m not saying any of this will be easy! It’s probably going to be humanity’s hardest task over our long history.

As an illustration of points worthy of further discussion, I offer this diagram that highlights strengths and weakness of both the “governance” and “pause” approaches:

DimensionGovernance (Continue AGI Development with Oversight)Pause (Moratorium on AGI Development)
Core StrategyImplement global rules, standards, and monitoring while AGI is developedImpose a temporary but enforceable pause on new AGI-capable systems until safety can be assured
AssumptionsGovernance structures can keep pace with AI progress;
Compliance can be verified
Public and political will can enforce a pause;
Technical progress can be slowed
BenefitsEncourages innovation while managing risks;
Allows early harnessing of AGI for societal benefit;
Promotes global collaboration mechanisms
Buys time to improve safety research;
Reduces risk of premature, unsafe AGI;
Raises chance of achieving Beneficial General Intelligence (BGI) instead of CGI
RisksGovernance may be too slow, fragmented, or under-enforced;
Race dynamics could undermine agreements;
Possibility of catastrophic failure despite regulation
Hard to achieve global compliance;
Incentives for “rogue” actors to defect, in the absence of compelling monitoring;
Risk of stagnation or loss of trust in governance processes
Implementation ChallengesRequires international treaties;
Robust verification and auditing mechanisms;
Balancing national interests vs. global good
Defining what counts as “AGI-capable” research;
Enforcing restrictions across borders and corporations;
Maintaining pause momentum without indefinite paralysis
Historical AnalogiesNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
Montreal Protocol (ozone layer);
Financial regulation frameworks
Nuclear test bans;
Moratoria on human cloning research;
Apollo program wind-down (pause in space race intensity)
Long-Term Outcomes (if successful)Controlled and safer path to AGI;
Possibility of Sustainable Superabundance but with higher risk of misalignment
Higher probability of reaching Sustainable Superabundance safely, but risks innovation slowdown or “black market” AGI

In short, governance offers continuity and innovation but with heightened risks of misalignment, whereas a pause increases the chances of long-term safety but faces serious feasibility hurdles.

Perhaps the best way to loosen attitudes, to allow a healthier conversation on the above points and others arising, is exposure to a greater diversity of thoughtful analysis.

And that brings me back to Global Governance of the Transition to Artificial General Intelligence by Jerome Glenn.

A necessary focus

Jerome’s book contains his personal stamp all over. His is a unique passion – that the particular risks and issues of AGI should not be swept into a side-discussion about the risks and issues of today’s AI. These latter discussions are deeply important too, but time and again, they result in existential questions about AGI being kicked down the road for months or even years. That’s something Jerome regularly challenges, rightly, and with vigour and intelligence.

Jerome’s presence is felt all over the book in one other way – he has painstakingly curated and augmented the insights of scores of different contributors and reviewers, including

  • Insights from 55 AGI experts and thought leaders across six major regions – the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, and Russia
  • The online panel of 229 participants from the global community around The Millennium Project who logged into a Real Time Delphi study of potential solutions to AGI governance, and provided at least one answer
  • Chairs and co-chairs of the 70 nodes of The Millennium Project worldwide, who provided additional feedback and opinion.

The book therefore includes many contradictory suggestions, but Jerome has woven these different threads of thoughts into a compelling unified tapestry.

The result is a book that carries the kind of pricing normally reserved for academic text books (as insisted by the publisher). My suggestion to you is that you recommend your local library to obtain a copy of what is a unique collection of ideas.

Finally, about my hallucination, mentioned at the start of this review. On double-checking, I realise that Jerome’s statement is actually, “Humanity has never faced a greater intelligence than itself.” The opening paragraph of that introduction continues,

Within a few years, most people reading these words will live with such superior artificial nonhuman intelligence for the rest of their lives. This book is intended to help us shape that intelligence or, more likely, those intelligences as they emerge.

Shaping the intelligence of the AI systems that are on the point of emerging is, indeed, a vital task.

And as Ben Goertzel says in his Foreword,

These are fantastic and unprecedented times, in which the impending technological singularity is no longer the province of visionaries and outsiders but almost the standard perspective of tech industry leaders. The dawn of transformative intelligence surpassing human capability – the rise of artificial general intelligence, systems capable of reasoning, learning, and innovating across domains in ways comparable to, or beyond, human capabilities – is now broadly accepted as a reasonably likely near-term eventuality, rather than a vague long-term potential.

The moral, social, and political implications of this are at least as striking as the technological ones. The choices we make now will define not only the future of technology but also the trajectory of our species and the broader biosphere.

To which I respond: whether we make these choices well or badly will depend on which aspects of humanity we allow to dominate our global conversation. Will humanity turn out to be its own worst enemy? Or its own best friend?

Postscript: Opportunity at the United Nations

Like it or loathe it, the United Nations still represents one of the world’s best venues where serious international discussion can, sometimes, take place on major issues and risks.

From 22nd to 30th September, the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) will be holding what it calls its “high-level week”. This includes a multi-day “General Debate”, described as follows:

At the General Debate – the annual meeting of Heads of State and Government at the beginning of the General Assembly session – world leaders make statements outlining their positions and priorities in the context of complex and interconnected global challenges.

Ahead of this General Debate, the national delegates who will be speaking on behalf of their countries have the ability to recommend to the President of the UNGA that particular topics be named in advance as topics to be covered during the session. If the advisors to these delegates are attuned to the special issues of AGI safety, they should press their representative to call for that topic to be added to the schedule.

If this happens, all other countries will then be required to do their own research into that topic. That’s because each country will be expected to state its position on this issue, and no diplomat or politician wants to look uninformed. The speakers will therefore contact the relevant experts in their own country, and, ideally, will do at least some research of their own. Some countries might call for a pause in AGI development if it appears impossible to establish national licensing systems and international governance in sufficient time.

These leaders (and their advisors) would do well to read the report recently released by the UNCPGA entitled “Governance of the Transition to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI): Urgent Considerations for the UN General Assembly” – a report which I wrote about three months ago.

As I said at that time, anyone who reads that report carefully, and digs further into some of the excellent of references it contains, ought to be jolted out of any sense of complacency. The sooner, the better.

29 May 2025

Governance of the transition to AGI: Time to act

As reported yesterday by The Millennium Project, the final report has been released by a high-level expert panel, convened by the UN Council of Presidents of the General Assembly (UNCPGA), on the subject of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The report is titled “Governance of the Transition to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI): Urgent Considerations for the UN General Assembly”. It’s well worth reading!

About the UNCPGA

What’s the UNCPGA, you may ask.

Founded in 1992, this Council consists of all former Presidents of the UN General Assembly. I think of it as akin to the House of Lords in the UK, where former members of the House of Commons often display more wisdom and objectivity than when they were embedded in the yah-boo tribal politics of day-to-day government and opposition. These former Presidents hold annual meetings to determine how they can best advance the goals of the UN and support the Office of the current President of the UNGA.

At their 2024 meeting in Seoul, the UNCPGA decided that a global panel of experts on AGI should be convened. Here’s an extract from the agreement reached at that meeting:

The Seoul Declaration 2024 of the UNCPGA calls for a panel of artificial general intelligence (AGI) experts to provide a framework and guidelines for the UN General Assembly to consider in addressing the urgent issues of the transition to artificial general intelligence (AGI).

This work should build on and avoid duplicating the extensive efforts on AI values and principles by UNESCO, OECD, G20, G7, Global Partnership on AI, and Bletchley Declaration, and the recommendations of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Body on AI, UN Global Digital Compact, the International Network of AI Safety Institutes, European Council’s Framework Convention on AI and the two UN General Assembly Resolutions on AI. These have focused more on narrower forms of AI. There is currently a lack of similar attention to AGI.

AI is well known to the world today and often used but AGI is not and does not exist yet. Many AGI experts believe it could be achieved within 1-5 years and eventually could evolve into an artificial super intelligence beyond our control. There is no universally accepted definition of AGI, but most AGI experts agree it would be a general-purpose AI that can learn, edit its code, and act autonomously to address many novel problems with novel solutions similar to or beyond human abilities. Current AI does not have these capabilities, but the trajectory of technical advances clearly points in that direction…

The report should identify the risks, threats, and opportunities of AGI. It should focus on raising awareness of mobilizing the UN General Assembly to address AGI governance in a more systematic manner. It is to focus on AGI that has not yet been achieved, rather than current forms of more narrow AI systems. It should stress the urgency of addressing AGI issues as soon as possible considering the rapid developments of AGI, which may present serious risks to humanity as well as extraordinary benefits to humanity.

The panel was duly formed, with the following participants:

  • Jerome Glenn (USA), Chair
  • Renan Araujo (Brazil)
  • Yoshua Bengio (Canada)
  • Joon Ho Kwak (Republic of Korea)
  • Lan Xue (China)
  • Stuart Russell (UK and USA)
  • Jaan Tallinn (Estonia)
  • Mariana Todorova (Bulgaria)
  • José Jaime Villalobos (Costa Rica)

(For biographical details of the participants, the mandate they were given following the Seoul event, and the actual report they delivered, click here.)

The panel was tasked with preparing and delivering its report at the 2025 gathering of the UNCPGA, which took place in April in Bratislava. Following a positive reception at that event, the report is now being made public.

Consequences if no action is taken

The report contains the following headline: “Urgency for UN General Assembly action on AGI governance and likely consequences if no action is taken“:

Amidst the complex geopolitical environment and in the absence of cohesive and binding international norms, a competitive rush to develop AGI without adequate safety measures is increasing the risk of accidents or misuse, weaponization, and existential failures. Nations and corporations are prioritizing speed over security, undermining national governing frameworks, and making safety protocols secondary to economic or military advantage. Since many forms of AGI from governments and corporations could emerge before the end of this decade, and since establishing national and international governance systems will take years, it is urgent to begin the necessary procedures to prevent the following outcomes…

The report lists the following six outcomes, that urgently require action to avoid:

1. Irreversible Consequences—Once AGI is achieved, its impact may be irreversible. With many frontier forms of AI already showing deceptive and self-preservation behavior, and the push towards more autonomous, interacting, self-improving AIs integrated with infrastructures, the impacts and trajectory of AGI can plausibly end up being uncontrollable. If that happens, there may be no way to return to a state of reliable human oversight. Proactive governance is essential to ensure that AGI will not cross our red lines, leading to uncontrollable systems with no clear way to return to human control.

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction—AGI could enable some states and malicious non-state actors to build chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Moreover, large, AGI-controlled swarms of lethal autonomous weapons could themselves constitute a new category of WMDs.

3. Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities—Critical national systems (e.g., energy grids, financial systems, transportation networks, communication infrastructure, and healthcare systems) could be subject to powerful cyberattacks launched by or with the aid of AGI. Without national deterrence and international coordination, malicious non-state actors from terrorists to transnational organized crime could conduct attacks at a large scale.

4. Power Concentration, Global Inequality, and Instability—Uncontrolled AGI development and usage could exacerbate wealth and power disparities on an unprecedented scale. If AGI remains in the hands of a few nations, corporations, or elite groups, it could entrench economic dominance and create global monopolies over intelligence, innovation, and industrial production. This could lead to massive unemployment, widespread disempowerment affecting legal underpinnings, loss of privacy, and collapse of trust in institutions, scientific knowledge, and governance. It could undermine democratic institutions through persuasion, manipulation, and AI-generated propaganda, and heighten geopolitical instability in ways that increase systemic vulnerabilities. A lack of coordination could result in conflicts over AGI resources, capabilities, or control, potentially escalating into warfare. AGI will stress existing legal frameworks: many new and complex issues of intellectual property, liability, human rights, and sovereignty could overwhelm domestic and international legal systems.

5. Existential Risks—AGI could be misused to create mass harm or developed in ways that are misaligned with human values; it could even act autonomously beyond human oversight, evolving its own objectives according to self-preservation goals already observed in current frontier AIs. AGI might also seek power as a means to ensure it can execute whatever objectives it determines, regardless of human intervention. National governments, leading experts, and the companies developing AGI have all stated that these trends could lead to scenarios in which AGI systems seek to overpower humans. These are not far-fetched science fiction hypotheticals about the distant future—many leading experts consider that these risks could all materialize within this decade, and their precursors are already occurring. Moreover, leading AI developers have no viable proposal so far for preventing these risks with high confidence.

6. Loss of Extraordinary Future Benefits for All of Humanity—Properly managed AGI promises improvements in all fields, for all peoples, from personalized medicine, curing cancer, and cell regeneration, to individualized learning systems, ending poverty, addressing climate change, and accelerating scientific discoveries with unimaginable benefits. Ensuring such a magnificent future for all requires global governance, which begins with improved global awareness of both the risks and benefits. The United Nations is critical to this mission.

In case you think these scenarios are unfounded fantasies, I encourage you to read the report itself, where the experts provide references for further reading.

The purpose envisioned for UN governance

Having set out the challenges, the report proceeds to propose the purpose to be achieved by UN governance of the transition to AGI:

Given that AGI might well be developed within this decade, it is both scientifically and ethically imperative that we build robust governance structures to prepare both for the extraordinary benefits and extraordinary risks it could entail.

The purpose of UN governance in the transition to AGI is to ensure that AGI development and usage are aligned with global human values, security, and development. This involves:

1) Advancing AI alignment and control research to identify technical methods for steering and/or controlling increasingly capable AI systems;

2) Providing guidance for the development of AGI—establishing frameworks to ensure AGI is developed responsibly, with robust security measures, transparency, and in alignment with human values;

3) Developing governance frameworks for the deployment and use of AGI—preventing misuse, ensuring equitable access, and maximizing its benefits for humanity while minimizing risks;

4) Fostering future visions of beneficial AGI—new frameworks for social, environmental, and economic development; and

5) Providing a neutral, inclusive platform for international cooperation—setting global standards, building an international legal framework, and creating incentives for compliance; thereby, fostering trust among nations to guarantee global access to the benefits of AGI.

Actions recommended

The report proceeds to offer four recommendations for further consideration during a UN General Assembly session specifically on AGI:

A. Global AGI Observatory: A Global AGI Observatory is needed to track progress in AGI-relevant research and development and provide early warnings on AI security to Member States. This Observatory should leverage the expertise of other UN efforts such as the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI created by the Global Digital Compact and the UNESCO Readiness Assessment Methodology.

B. International System of Best Practices and Certification for Secure and Trustworthy AGI: Given that AGI might well be developed within this decade, it is both scientifically and ethically imperative that we build robust governance structures to prepare both for the extraordinary benefits and extraordinary risks it could entail.

C. UN Framework Convention on AGI: A Framework Convention on AGI is needed to establish shared objectives and flexible protocols to manage AGI risks and ensure equitable global benefit distribution. It should define clear risk tiers requiring proportionate international action, from standard-setting and licensing regimes to joint research facilities for higher-risk AGI, and red lines or tripwires on AGI development. A Convention would provide the adaptable institutional foundation essential for globally legitimate, inclusive, and effective AGI governance, minimizing global risks and maximizing global prosperity from AGI.

D. Feasibility Study on a UN AGI Agency: Given the breadth of measures required to prepare for AGI and the urgency of the issue, steps are needed to investigate the feasibility of a UN agency on AGI, ideally in an expedited process. Something like the IAEA has been suggested, understanding that AGI governance is far more complex than nuclear energy; and hence, requiring unique considerations in such a feasibility study.

What happens next

I’m on record as being pessimistic that the UNGA will ever pay sufficient attention to the challenges of governing the transition to AGI. (See the section “The collapse of cooperation is nigh” in this recent essay of mine.)

But I’m also on record as seeing optimistic scenarios too, in which humanity “chooses cooperation, not chaos”.

What determines whether international bodies such as the UN will take sufficient action – or whether, instead, insightful reports are left to gather dust as the body focuses on virtue signalling?

There are many answers to that question, but for now, I’ll say just this. It’s up to you. And to me. And to all of us.

That is, each of us has the responsibility to reach out, directly or indirectly, to the teams informing the participants at the UN General Assembly. In other words, it’s up to us to find ways to catch the attention of the foreign ministry in our countries, so that they demand:

  • Adequate timetabling at the UNGA for the kind of discussion that the UNCPGA report recommends
  • Appropriate follow-up: actions, not just words

That may sound daunting, but a fine piece of advice has recently been shared online by Leticia García Martínez, Policy Advisor at ControlAI. Her article is titled “What We Learned from Briefing 70+ Lawmakers on the Threat from AI” and I recommend that you read it carefully. It is full of pragmatic suggestions that are grounded in recent experience.

ControlAI are gathering signatures on a short petition:

Nobel Prize winners, AI scientists, and CEOs of leading AI companies have stated that mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority.

Specialised AIs – such as those advancing science and medicine – boost growth, innovation, and public services. Superintelligent AI systems would compromise national and global security.

The UK can secure the benefits and mitigate the risks of AI by delivering on its promise to introduce binding regulation on the most powerful AI systems.

Happily, this petition has good alignment with the report to the UNCPGA:

  • Support for the remarkable benefits possible from AI
  • Warnings about the special risks from AGI or superintelligent AI
  • A determination to introduce binding regulation.

New politicians continue to be added to their campaign webpage as supporters of this petition.

The next thing that needs to happen in the UK parliament is that their APPG (All Party Parliamentary Group) on AI need to devote sufficient time to AGI / superintelligence. Regrettably, up till now, they’ve far too often sidestepped that issue, focussing instead of issues of today’s AI, rather than the supercharged issues of AGI. Frankly, it’s a failure of vision, and a prevalence of groupthink.

Hopefully, as the advisors to the APPG-AI read the UNCPGA report, they’ll be jolted out of their complacency.

It’s time to act. Now.

Postscript: Jerome Glenn visiting London

Jerome (Jerry) Glenn, the chair of the expert panel that produced this report, and who is also the founder and executive director of the Millennium Project, will be visiting London on the weekend of Saturday 14th June.

There will be a number of chances for people in and around London to join discussions with Jerry. That includes a session from 2pm to 4pm on that Saturday, “The Future of AI: Issues, Opportunities, and Geopolitical Synergies”, as well as a session in the morning “State of the Future 20.0”, and an open-ended discussion in the early evening, “The Future – Where Next?”.

For more details of these events, and to register to attend, click here.

13 January 2022

Measuring – and forecasting – the health of the planet

An invitation to join a Millennium Project Delphi Study on the State of the Future

Assessments of individual health have been on my mind a lot recently, as I’ve observed my own physical body display less resilience in the face of stress than was the case when I was younger. (See my previous two blog posts, here and here, for the gory details.)

But alongside questions about the health of individuals, a larger set of questions loom. How is the health of global society as a whole? Are we headed toward major reversals, which could knock us collectively off course, akin to how diseases such as Covid-19 have intruded, often horribly, on individual lives?

Indeed, in any such assessment of the overall health of global society, what should we be measuring? Which factors are “symptoms” and which are closer to being “root causes”?

The Millennium Project has been addressing that subject on a regular basis since its formation in 1996. It regularly publishes updates on what it calls “The 15 global challenges” and, in a wider survey, “The State of the Future”.

What distinguishes the Millennium Project analysis from various other broadly similar enquiries is the “Delphi” method it uses to reach its conclusions. This involves an iterative online interaction between members of an extended community, who are asked their opinions on a number of questions, with the option for participants to revise their opinions if they read input from other respondents that brings new considerations to their mind.

The reason I’m mentioning this now is that a new Delphi survey is now starting, and there’s scope for a number of my acquaintances to take part. (Dear Reader: That includes you.)

This survey is being structured differently from previous years, and is using a new tool. Participants will be asked to offer estimates on 29 metrics for the year 2030 – including the best and worst potential value the indicator might have in 2030. You’ll also be asked which of the metrics are the most important (and which are the least).

To help you provide answers, the system already contains data points stretching several decades into the past.

The metrics include:

  • Income inequality (income share held by highest 10%)
  • Unemployment (% of total labour force)
  • Life expectancy at birth (years)
  • Physicians (per 1,000 people)
  • Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)
  • People using safely managed drinking water services (% of population)
  • CO2-equivalent concentration in the atmosphere (ppm)
  • Energy efficiency (GDP per unit of energy use)
  • Electricity production from renewable sources (% of total)
  • Individuals using the Internet (% of population)
  • Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (% of members)
  • Number of conflicts between different states
  • Refugee population

You won’t have to answer all the questions. Instead, you can direct your attention to the questions where you feel you have some particular insight. You can browse the other questions at a later time. And, as mentioned, you can revisit some of your earlier answers once you see comments made by other participants. Indeed, it is in the interaction between different comments where the greatest insight is likely to arise.

If you think you’d like to take part, please get in touch with me. Note that the Millennium Project will give priority to people with the following roles: professional futurists, scientists (including social scientists as well as natural scientists), policymakers, science and technology experts, advisors to government or business, members of NGOs, UN liaison, and professional consultants.

The Delphi questionnaire will remain open until 31 January, 2022. The findings of the questionnaire will feature in a London Futurists event later in the year.

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